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1Why do listed rms pay for market making in their own stock?
Abstract
A recent innovation in equity markets is the introduction of market maker ser-
vices paid for by the listed companies themselves. We investigate why rms are
willing to pay a cost to improve the secondary market liquidity of their shares. We
show that a contributing factor in this decision is the likelihood that the rm will
interact with the capital markets in the near future, either because they have capi-
tal needs, or that they are planning to repurchase shares. We also nd a signicant
reduction in liquidity risk and cost of capital for rms that hire a market maker.
Firms that prior to hiring a market maker has a high loading on a liquidity risk
factor, experience a signicant reduction in liquidity risk to a level similar to that
of the larger and more liquid stocks on the exchange.
Keywords: Stock market liquidity, corporate nance, designated market makers, equity
issuance
JEL Codes: G10; G20
Introduction
Historically, the typical trading structure for equities involved market makers with re-
sponsibility for maintaining an orderly market in a stock, such as the specialist at the
NYSE. With the evolution of market structures towards electronic limit order markets,
where participants provide liquidity themselves, the market maker seemed destined for
the scrap heap. Recently, though, markets makers have been reappearing. In several elec-
tronic limit order markets, market participants have appeared with promises to maintain
an orderly market in a particular stock, for example by keeping the spread at or below
some agreed upon maximum. The innovation of these Designated Market Makers (here-
after DMMs) is that they charge a fee to the rm that has issued the equity to keep an
orderly market in the rm's stock.
DMMs have appeared in several countries such as the Netherlands, France, Germany
and Sweden. The DMM introductions have been studied for all these markets, where the
main question examined is whether liquidity improves following the initiation of DMM
agreements. A consensus nding in this research is that liquidity improves, and that
the improvement in liquidity is particularly large for small illiquid stocks. While these
results are interesting, they are not particularly surprising. A DMM have a contractual
agreement with the rm to improve its secondary market liquidity against a fee, so if this
agreement is not honored they may have problems justifying the fee.
In this paper we look at the hiring of DMMs from a dierent perspective. We inves-
tigate the motives for corporations to pay this cost for improving the secondary market
2liquidity. While improved market liquidity clearly is benecial to short term traders, on
the face of it, this seems to be a cost with little benet to the rm. After all, the rm has
paid the cost of becoming listed at the IPO, after that what happens on the exchange
is just trading between dierent owners of the rm, of interest to the owners, not the
rm. But, there are occasions when the rm returns to the stock market. The most
obvious one is when a rm wants to raise more capital through a SEO. Another occasion
is when the rm wants to buy back some of its shares through open market repurchases.
At both these occasions it is benecial to the rm to have a liquid secondary market
for its stock. Both the SEO price and the repurchase price will better reect realities if
the stock is more liquid. If rms are rationally balancing a cost of maintaining a liquid
market against its benets, we should see that rms that are more likely to interact with
the capital market in the future are more willing to pay the cost of hiring a DMM.
To look at this question we use data from the introduction of DMM's at the Oslo Stock
Exchange (OSE). The possibility of hiring a designated market maker was introduced at
the OSE in 2004, following the example of the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Since then,
around a hundred rms have hired (or rehired) designated market makers at the Oslo
Stock Exchange.
In the rst part of the paper we show that, similarly to other markets, the liquidity of a
company's shares improves following the hiring of a DMM. Consistent with what is found
in other markets, we also nd that there is a positive announcement eect associated with
rms announcing DMM agreements.
Having established that both the liquidity and price eects associated with DMM
agreements is similar in our sample to what is found at other exchanges, we next ask the
more novel question of why rms enter into DMM agreements in the rst place. We argue
that from the rm's point of view, this must be because the rm's value is potentially
aected by either changes in future cashows or changes in the discount rate. Looking
rst at the cash ow channel, we relate the likelihood of hiring a DMM with measures
of planned repurchases and capital needs, proxied by Q and sales growth. We also relate
hiring a DMM to whether rms ex post issue capital or repurchase shares. Using various
regression specications we nd that measures of capital needs and later interactions with
the capital markets all predict a higher likelihood of hiring a DMM.
Secondly, looking at the discount rate channel, we examine, in an asset pricing frame-
work, the eect of hiring a DMM on liquidity risk. Since the DMM is paid by the rm
to keep the spread below an agreed maximum, the DMM can not regain any losses to
informed traders by increasing the spread above the agreed maximum. This means that
the DMM potentially takes on some of the liquidity risk that otherwise would have been
reected in wider spreads. The presence of a DMM may thus cause a reduction in the
3stock's liquidity risk. This is exactly what we nd. In the sample of rms that hire a
DMM, we nd a signicant drop in the loading on the liquidity risk factor in a two-factor
asset pricing model. Firms that hire a DMM experience a drop in liquidity risk to a level
that is close to that of the largest and most liquid stocks on the exchange. To illustrate
the economic signicance of this result, we show that the reduction in liquidity risk re-
duces the expected returns by about 2.5% on an annual basis, which suggest that hiring
a DMM reduces the cost of raising capital signicantly.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We rst discuss the relevant literature, and
place our questions in context. In section 2 we provide some descriptive statistics for the
DMM contracts at the Oslo Stock Exchange. We then look at the eects on the market
of DMM introductions in section 3. In section 4 we examine the central question of the
paper, what aect the rm's decision to hire a DMM. In section 5 we examine the eect
of DMMs on liquidity risk to provide an estimate of the eect on rms cost of capital,
before we conduct a brief discussion and conclude.
1 The problem
A market maker is a participant at the stock exchange which assumes a special obligation
to maintain a market in the trading of a given stock. What is implied in this varies across
markets. At the NYSE the market maker is called a specialist, and is assigned which
stocks to maintain the market in by the stock exchange. One of the obligations of a
NYSE specialist is to continuously quote bid and ask prices valid for a minimal quantity.
However, the NYSE is a hybrid market structure. In a pure limit order market there is
no such market maker, all that is available for trade is trading interest put in by market
participants. A limit order market can have eective market makers if there are market
participants that continuously put in buy and sell orders for given quantities, orders which
are updated as trading evolves. As long as the same market participant simultaneously
submits buy and sell orders with a spread between them this market participant behaves
as a market maker. A Designated Market Maker (DMM) is such a market participant,
which charges a fee to the company which has issued a stock, to continuously maintain
the possibility to trade small orders within a specied spread.
In the theoretical market microstructure literature, the market maker faces costs asso-
ciated with keeping inventory (see e.g. Garman (1976), Amihud and Mendelson (1980))
as well as a risk of being picked o by informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985).
To adjust his inventory and to regain expected losses to informed traders, the market
maker adjusts quoted bid and ask prices and hence the spread. Intuitively, the market
maker has two dimensions to play with: moving the price, and widening/narrowing the
4spread. Relative to the typical market maker a DMM does not have the same exibility to
widen the spread in times of adverse information shocks, due the contractual obligation
to keep the bid-ask spread below an agreed maximum.1 To minimize the costs of the
DMM obligation, it becomes more important for the DMM to set the right price. One
eect of a rm having a DMM may thus be more informative prices, since the market
maker needs to spend more energy on moving the price in response to new information.
In other words, the DMM is taking on costs and risks that otherwise would have been
passed on to the traders in the secondary market by widening of the spread. Instead,
these costs are now covered by the rm through the fee charged by the DMM.
We want to investigate why listed rms want to hire a DMM. As we discussed above,
the function of a DMM is to improve the quality of trading the rm's shares in the
secondary market. On the face of it, this does not aect the rm's operations in any way.
Why should then the rm do it? It may here be instructive to do the discussion from a
corporate valuation perspective. What determines rm value? Let us take the simplest
such case, and let current rm value V be the result of a perpetuity of future annual cash





With this perspective, for any corporate action to aect rm value it will have to
aect either future cash ows (X) or the discount rate (r). Now, a rm which pays for
DMM services has a known cash outow, the cost of DMM services. By that token
V =
X   Cost of DMM services
r
would indicate a lowering of rm value. However, all empirical studies of introduction of
DMM's have found a positive stock price reaction at the time of announcement of DMM
hiring,2 which imply an increase in rm value. To explain an increase in rm value we
therefore have to look for either other cash ow consequences or a change in the cost of
1At most exchanges, a DMM has an option to suspend the contractual obligation to maintain a
minimum spread if there are special circumstances, such as news releases from the company, but this
needs to be justied, and may be reputationally costly for the DMM.
2Such empirical investigations have been carried out by Anand, Tanggaard, and Weaver (2009) which
looks at the Swedish case, Menkveld and Wang (2009) for Euronext, Hengelbrock (2008) for the German
market, and Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007) for the Paris Bourse. The focus of these papers is the
impact of DMM introductions on liquidity. A general nding is that liquidity improves following the




X   Cost of DMM services + Other cash ow consequences
r + Change in cost of capital
:
This basic corporate nance perspective is a useful way of structuring our analysis.
Let us start by asking how can the hiring of a DMM to improve the liquidity in the
trading in the secondary market aect future cashows. If the rm never need to go back
to the capital market this liquidity will not aect the rms cash ow in any material
way. We therefore have to look at occasions with interactions between the rm and
capital markets. The obvious ones are times when the rm issue new equity capital or
repurchases equity, but there may be others.
What are the potential cash ows related to the rm's raising of new capital (Seasoned
Equity Oer - SEO)? There is a direct channel, the direct cost of issuing new equity,
either as a private placement or as a general issue to the rm's owners. In the more
recent literature on SEO's stock liquidity is found to aect the terms of issuance.3 Firms
with more liquid stock can therefore expect to have a lower cost of raising new equity
capital. There are also a number of more indirect eects related to capital structure.
The choice between debt and equity is aected if the terms of raising equity changes. In
fact Butler and Wan (2010) links debt issuance directly with stock liquidity. It may also
indirectly aect decisions related to dividends (Banerjee, Gatchev, and Spindt, 2007).
Since the expected costs today are a product of the probability of the future capital event
times the costs, when they occur, we would expect the rms that are more likely to need
capital in the near future (higher probability) to care more about the liquidity of the
rm's stock. Hiring of DMM's should be positively related to the likelihood that the rm
will need capital.
Another case where the rm interacts with the capital market is the opposite of
raising equity, namely stock repurchases, occasions when corporations buys back some
of its own shares. There is a large literature on buybacks, we refer to Vermaelen (2005)
for a survey. The question of motivations for buybacks is still somewhat open, but there
are two popular explanations. First, if the rm's shares are undervalued, it benets
the rm's long term owners if the rm buys the undervalued shares. Second, share
repurchases may be preferred to paying out cash as dividends, for example it may be
tax advantageous for the owners if capital gains are taxed dierently from dividends. No
matter what the motivation for repurchases, improving secondary liquidity in the stock
will lower a potential price impact when the rm buys back stock. Brockman, Howe,
and Mortal (2008) argue that managers compare the tax and exibility advantages of a
3See for example Ginglinger, Koenig-Matsoukis, and Riva (2009) and the references in that paper.
6repurchase to the liquidity cost. All else equal, higher market liquidity lowers the cost of
repurchasing relative to paying cash dividends. In line with this, they nd evidence that
managers condition their repurchase decision on the level of market liquidity. Thus, if a
rm is planning to initiate a repurchase program, this could be a potential motivation
for improving the liquidity of its shares.
The theoretical discussion above argues that the more likely that a rm plans to
interact with capital markets in the near future, the more likely they are to care about
the future negative cash ows (costs), and therefore more likely to employ DMM's. In
our empirical work we test this prediction, by asking whether DMM hirings are are linked
to factors that we argued above are related to future cash ows.
Let us next turn to the second channel through which rm valuc can be aected,
the discount rate. It is by now well accepted in the asset pricing literature that there is
a priced liquidity component in the cross-section of stock returns. An improvement in
liquidity brought on by the DMM may therefore aect the required return of the stock,
and therefore the discount rate.4 We also investigate this issue in our work, by testing if
the risk premium related to liquidity changes as a result of the DMM introduction, and
investigate the implications of such changes for the cost of capital.
A nal issue we introduce concerns the preferences of individual owners of a rm.
The standard valuation equation (1) calculates the value as the consensus value of the
rm in a world without transaction costs. It can be thought of as the value to an owner
planning to keep her shares indenitely. The picture is dierent for an owner that wants
to sell (or buy) shares. Such an owner will have to adjust for transaction costs
Value to trader =
X
r
 fraction of company traded   transaction costs:
The transaction cost is inuenced by the liquidity of the stock: The better the liquidity,
the lower the transaction costs (Harris, 2002). So, an owner planning to transact in the
near future would clearly want the rm to do its best to improve liquidity. However,
is not clear that the rm should do this on the owner's behalf. Why should the rm
make it easier for your random owner to vote with his feet? There are however some
owners for whom this may be a valid concern. In a recent study of the motivations for
why rms want to pay the cost of becoming listed, Brau and Fawcett (2006) uses surveys
to ask CFOs about these corporate motivations. According to their survey, the most
important factor for becoming listed is to facilitate takeovers, either as a target or as an
acquirer. For our purposes, though, the more interesting such motivation is their second
4For the asset pricing argument see the survey by Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen (2005). For the
link to the rm's cost of capital see the literature following Easley and O'Hara (2004).
7most important one, that an IPO provides an exit for the founders, employees, venture
capitalists, and other investors in the rm. This second motivation is clearly relevant for
the DMM decision. If the rm wants to facilitate the exit by e.g. founding shareholders,
they would want the stock to be as liquid as possible. In our empirical work we will also
evaluate this explanation.
Let us nally summarize the empirical implications of the above discussion. We have
shown that when we view the rm as a whole, if we want to justify a change in rm value
we have to either identify a change in future cashows, a change in the cost of capital, or
both. As potential cash ow items we identied costs of future equity and other capital
issuance, and stock repurchases. A potential factor aecting the cost of capital is the
liquidity premium in asset returns. Finally, if we move away from the \whole rm" view,
and instead look at individual owners, these will naturally prefer to have the highest
possible degree of liquidity. More specically, we argued that exit for the original inside
owners could be a motivation for the rm to improve liquidity, but not necessarily so as
a general rule, due to the public good nature of the improved liquidity.
2 The Oslo Stock Exchange and the data
Our sample of stocks are listed at the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in Norway. OSE is
a medium-sized stock exchange by European standards, and has stayed relatively inde-
pendent.5 The current trading structure in the market is an electronic limit order book.
The limit order book has the usual features, where orders always need to specify a price
and is subject to a strict price-time priority rule.
In 2004 the OSE introduced the possibility for nancial intermediaries to declare
themselves as Designated Market Makers for a rm's stock, where the rm pays the
DMM for the market making service. Formally, the exchange does not oversee these
DMM agreements, and have no say in them, but typically receive copies of the contracts.6
When such a contract is entered into it needs to be announced through the ocial notice
board of the exchange, and the announcement is required to give some detail about the
purposes of the contract. OSE provides a standardized contract. Although there may
be other contractual features, we are told that the standard contract is the typical one.
The DMM obligations in the standard contract is that the bid and ask quotes should be
5See Bhren and degaard (2001), Ns, Skjeltorp, and degaard (2009) and Ns, Skjeltorp, and
degaard (2008) for some discussion of the exchange and some descriptive statistics for trading at OSE.
6All rms that have a DMM agreement is included in the OB Match index, which is an index containing
the most liquid stocks at the exchange. Due to this, the surveillance department at the exchange track
the DMM activity in these stocks to ensure that the DMMs are fullling their obligations in accordance
with the contract.
8available at least 85% of the trading day, the minimum volume at both the bid and ask
quotes should equal 4 lots, and nally that the relative spread should not exceed 4%.
In the paper we are using data from the Oslo Stock Exchange data services, from
where we have access to daily price quotes, the announcements, the accounts, and so on.
The announcements also contain details about trades by corporate insiders.
In Table 1 we show some details about the introduction of DMMs at the OSE. We
show the number of new DMM deals and the total number of DMMs active in a given
year. We see that the number of DMM contracts is small relative to the total number of
listed rms, at the most (in 2008) there were 57 rms that had a DMM, out of 286 stocks
on the OSE in total, or about a fth of the rms on the exchange.7 The rms with DMM
are typically smaller, as can be seen from the split into four size quartiles also shown in
the table. In total over the sample we observe 111 cases where rms hire DMMs, but
some of these are cases where the same rm switches DMM or rehires a DMM after a
pause.8
Table 1
Describing DMM deals at the OSE
The table describes the activity of DMMs at the OSE, by listing the total number of rms on the
exchange during the year, together with the number of new DMM deals and the number of active DMM
deals. We also show the number of DMMs in four size quartiles, which are constructed by splitting the
rms into four groups based on the total value of the equity in the rm at the previous year-end. Firms
in size quartile 1 are the 25% smallest rms, and rms in size quartile 4 are the 25% largest rms.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total active stocks at OSE 207 238 258 292 286 263 235
New DMM contracts 7 23 17 20 16 15 11
Active DMM contracts 7 30 42 50 57 47 48
of which in rm size quartile 1 0 4 11 17 24 32 32
of which in rm size quartile 2 2 16 19 15 18 9 8
of which in rm size quartile 3 3 5 8 14 11 6 6
of which in rm size quartile 4 2 5 4 4 4 0 2
To give some further perspectives on the rms that employ DMMs, in Table 2 we
provide a number of summary statistics where we compare rms with a DMM in a
given year with those that does not have a DMM. We rst show a number of common
liquidity measures: Quoted and relative spreads, LOT (an estimate of transaction costs
introduced by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999)), and ILR (the measure of price
7There were 14 nancial institutions that were oering DMM contracts over the period.
8Some of the switches are due to choices by the company, and some are due to nancial rms stopping
providing DMM services. One example is the Icelandic bank Kaupthing, which had quite a number of
DMM contracts, but closed down as a result of the Icelandic banking crisis. Also, SEB Enskilda ASA,
quit all their DMM engagements in the beginning of 2009.
9elasticity introduced by Amihud (2002)).9 We also calculate two other measures of trading
activity: Fraction of the trading year with trades, and monthly turnover.
We additionally compare the size of the rms, measured in both asset values and
accounting income, sales growth, estimated Q, and the number of trades by corporate
insiders during a year. Finally, we estimate what fraction of the rms in the two groups
issue new equity or repurchase stocks in the given year. With regard to repurchases
we look at two denitions. First we count the number of rms that have announced a
repurchase plan.10 We also count the number of rms that ex post actually performed
repurchases.
Note that 2004 is atypical, we concentrate on the later years.11 Comparing the liq-
uidity of the two groups, we observe that there are some systematic dierences. All of
the quoted spread, relative spread (where we standardize the spread to the price level),
LOT, and the Amihud measures are systematically smaller for the DMM group.12 These
measures all look at the cost of trading stocks. Two other measures also look at trading
activity, which is another aspect of liquidity. DMM stocks are traded about as often as
the average non-DMM rm, but with less turnover.
With respect to the rm characteristics, the typical DMM rm is much smaller than
the other OSE rms. Interestingly, Tobin's Q for the DMM rms are higher than the
average non-DMM rm across all years except for 2004. This is consistent with an
explanation where rms that hire a DMM have higher growth opportunities, and are
more likely to need capital to nance new projects. The fraction of equity issuers for the
two groups also conforms to such a hypothesis, as we see that there is, for most years,
a larger fraction of rms within the DMM group that actually issue equity compared to
the non-DMM group. Finally, we see that there is also a larger fraction of rms that
repurchase shares in the DMM group.
Note that many of the rms on the OSE are not trading every day. Let us show some
details on this. In gure 1 we show the distribution of fraction of year traded, which is
9All the liquidity measures we use here are calculated from daily (closing) observations. We do
unfortunately not have transactions level data for this recent period at the OSE, otherwise we would
have looked at more detailed microstructure measures of liquidity. For details about how the liquidity
measures are calculated see Ns et al. (2008) or Ns, Skjeltorp, and degaard (2011).
10At the OSE rms have to get an approval of the annual meeting before they can repurchase shares.
This approval is valid for a maximum of 15 months before it has to be renewed by the annual meeting.
We therefore count as a planned repurchase when the rm has an approval by the annual meeting that
allows it to repurchase.
11The OSE rst allowed DMM agreements in October of 2004, this means that the number of rms
in the DMM group for 2004 is low (seven rms), and statistics for the DMM group would only measure
the dierence for the last three months of 2004.
12Comparing the quoted spread (NOK) and the relative spread, a notable feature is that the dier-
ence in quoted spread seem much larger in magnitude between DMM and non-DMM stocks than the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11simply the number of days in the year that a stock is traded divided by the number of
days the stock is listed. We see that this variable is highly skewed. Most stocks is traded
almost every day, but there is a large group which is traded less often. It is for rms in
this latter group that it makes sense to hire a DMM. If your stock has enough trading
activity that it trades every day, there is no need to hire a DMM to keep the spreads
below 4%, there is enough trading interest to keep the spreads low anyway. This point
is illustrated in panel B of the gure, where we show the distribution of fraction of the
year with trading for the rms which have hired a DMM. Note that most of these rms
are trading much less than every day. We also show the dierence one year before and
one year after the DMM introduction. Note the shift to the right in the gure.13
In gure 2 we use histograms of relative spreads to illustrate in more detail the dis-
tribution of liquidity. The histogram in Panel A shows the distribution of relative spread
for the companies that do not have a DMM in a given year. In Panel B we look at rms
that enter a DMM agreement. On the left we show the distribution of relative spread
for the year before the date the DMM contract is initiated, on the right we show the
distribution for the year after the DMM initiation. An important observation from these
histogram is that the DMM users are not the most liquid rms. Rather, it is the group
of rms with low to medium spreads which seem to want hire a DMM to improve their
liquidity. A plausible cause of this is that for the most liquid rms there is no need for a
DMM, the spreads are kept low anyway by the amount of trade interest. We also note
from the histogram in panel A that there are rms with very high spreads that do not
hire a DMM.
A nal descriptive exercise is to calculate the correlations between some of these
variables, shown in Table 3. Note that these are contemporaneous correlations of annual
aggregates. When we later study the determinants of the decision to hire a DMM we
need to be careful about timing, so these numbers are not exactly the same as those used
in the regressions. With that qualication in mind, it is still important to note that many
of the potential explanatory variables are correlated, such as Q and equity issuance.
3 The eect of hiring a DMM
In this section, we take a look at DMM introductions and their eects on liquidity and
other properties of the market. The main purpose is to examine whether the results found
for DMM introductions in other markets also holds in our sample for the OSE. First, we
examine whether dierent measures of liquidity improve after DMM introductions, and
13Actually, when we in our empirical analysis look at the decision to hire a DMM, we will exclude
those rms that trade almost every day.
12Figure 1
Distribution of fraction of year traded for DMM and non-DMM stocks
The gures show histograms of the distribution of fraction of year traded. We calculate the fraction of
year traded as the number of days in a year that a rm's stock actually traded, divided by the number
of days that the stock was listed. If the stock traded every day, the number is one. Panel A shows the
distribution for all rms on the exchange that do not have a DMM. The basis for the gure is rm years,
each year we check whether the rm has had a DMM at some point during the year. If it has, this stock
is in the group of DMM users, and removed from the sample. Panel B shows the distribution of fraction
of year traded for rms initiating a DMM. We look at the fraction one year before the DMM contract
starts running (the histogram on the left) and one year after the initiation (the histogram on the right).
In the sample we only use the rst time the rm hires a DMM.
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13Figure 2
Distribution of relative spread for DMM and non-DMM stocks
The gures show histograms of the distribution of average annual relative spread for two group of rms.
Panel A shows the distribution of relative spreads for all rms on the exchange that do not have a DMM.
The basis for the gure is rm years, each year we check whether the rm has had a DMM at some point
during the year. If it has, this stock is in the group of DMM users, and removed from the sample. Panel
B shows the distribution of relative spreads for rms initiating a DMM. We look at the average spreads
one year before the DMM contract starts running (the histogram on the left) and one year after the
initiation (the histogram on the right). In the sample we only use the rst time the rm hires a DMM.
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14Table 3
Correlations
The table shows (contemporaneous) correlations between annual observations of the following variables:
Relative Spread is the dierence between the best bid and ask price on each date with trades, divided
by the last trade price, averaged over a year. Firm size is the value of the rm's assets, Q is Tobin's
Q calculated as the market value to book value of rms assets, Inside Trades is the number of large
inside sales during the year. Issue equity this year is a dummy variable equal to one if the rm issues
equity during the next year, and similarly Actual Repurchase is a dummy variable equal to one if the
rm repurchases shares during the next year. Announced repurchases is a dummy variable equal to one
if the rm has an announced repurchase program. Sales growth is the percentage change in operating
income. Have DMM is a dummy variable equal to one if rm has a DMM sometime during the year
and Hire DMM is a dummy variable equal to one if rm hires a DMM sometime during the year. Frac
trading days is the number of days that the stock is traded divided by the days the stock is listed and
Listed within 2 years is a dummy variable equal to one if the time since the rm was listed is less than
2 years.
Relative Firm Inside Issue Repurchases Sales Have Hire Frac
Spread Size Q sales Equity Announce Actual Growth DMM DMM trad days
Firm size 0.05
Q 0.04 0.06
No inside trades 0.06 0.17 0.26
Issue equity next year 0.02 -0.08 0.13 0.07
Announced repurchases 0.06 0.17 0.09 0.32 -0.07
Repurchase next year -0.02 0.13 0.08 0.19 -0.15 0.27
Sales growth 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.33 0.11 0.33 0.08
Have DMM 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.29 0.06 0.45 0.15 0.73
Hire DMM 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.32 0.08 0.47 0.14 0.78 0.94
Frac trading days 0.74 0.37 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.11 -0.03 0.13 0.13 0.15
listed within 2 years -0.09 -0.13 0.06 -0.02 0.13 -0.20 -0.09 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 -0.11
15then we look at the market reaction to DMM announcements using an event study.
3.1 Does liquidity change?
We answer this question in a very simple manner, by comparing the liquidity before
and after the introduction of DMMs. In Table 4 we look at the ve dierent liquidity
measures for the year, and six month period, before and after the initiation of the DMM
agreement.
Table 4
Liquidity measures before and after DMM agreements
We describe what happens after the market maker deals, by showing liquidity measures calculated using
data for one year and six months before and after the market maker start. In these calculations we only
include stocks where we have observations for the whole period, and leave out those cases where the
DMM is hired at the same time that the stock is listed. The relative spread is the quoted spread at
the end of the trading day divided by the stock price at the close. The LOT measure is the Lesmond
et al. (1999) estimate of transaction costs and Amihud is the Amihud (2002) measure. Fraction of year
traded is the number of days that the stock trades, divided by the number of days it is listed. Monthly
Turnover is the fraction of the rms stock that is traded in a month. Numbers in parenthesis represent
p-values from a test of whether the change in liquidity is signicantly dierent from zero.
Period before Period after t-test di n
1 year 6 months 6 months one year 6 months 1 year
Rel Spread 0.039 0.039 0.024 0.026 -0.015 (0.00) -0.013 (0.00) 100
LOT 0.045 0.044 0.034 0.038 -0.009 (0.02) -0.006 (0.07) 100
Amihud 0.570 0.615 0.406 0.436 -0.186 (0.05) -0.106 (0.19) 100
Monthly Turnover 0.042 0.043 0.051 0.058 0.007 (0.15) 0.015 (0.02) 100
Fraction of year traded 0.753 0.756 0.824 0.817 0.073 (0.00) 0.071 (0.00) 100
For the six month period, we see that both the relative spread, the LOT and Amihud
measures fall signicantly after the DMM agreement has been initiated. This point was
also illustrated in panel B of gure 2, which showed the distribution of relative spread
before and after the DMM initiation. In the picture we clearly saw that the distribution
of relative spread shifted left after DMMs were introduced. For the one year window, the
reduction in relative spread and Amihud measure remains signicant, while the change
in the LOT measure is rendered insignicant. Interestingly, trading activity seem to
increase. The fraction of the trading year with trades increases, both over the six month
and one year horizon, and the increase in turnover becomes signicant at the one year
horizon. This may indicate that the reduction in transaction costs due to the introduction
of a DMM attracts traders to the stock causing trading activity to increase.
Another interesting observation is that the average relative spread before DMM con-
tracts are initiated is 3.9% for the year before. This is actually lower than the default
16contractual obligation to keep the spread below 4%. This may suggest that the cost to
the Designated Market Maker of maintaining a spread of 4% may be relatively low.
Overall, regarding the question of the eect of DMM initiations on liquidity, we see
that there is a signicant improvement in all liquidity measures around the DMM in-
troduction, which is consistent with research on other markets. This is however a result
which we should observe; i.e. it looks like the DMMs do what they are paid to do, improve
liquidity. The more interesting observation is that the DMM initiation is also associated
with an increase in trading days and turnover. Thus, there may be an externality from
hiring a DMM in the sense that\liquidity attracts liquidity".
3.2 Market reaction
A more open question is whether the market values the DMM contracts. To answer this
question we perform an event study, where the date when the rm announces a DMM is
the \event date". The market reaction is measured by the cumulative abnormal return
at the date when the DMM agreements are announced to the market. We exclude stocks
that started trading simultaneously with the DMM initiation,14 and stocks where we can
not identify with certainty the announcement date.
In gure 3 and panel A of Table 5 we show the results of this event study, where
we start 5 trading days before the event date and plot the aggregate CAR for the next
ten trading days. In aggregate there is a positive reaction of about 1% just around the
announcement date. The reaction is signicant, as shown by the tests in panel A of
Table 5.
This positive market reaction is consistent with other research. For example, Anand
et al. (2009) nd a CAR around liquidity provider introduction of about 7% in their
Swedish sample, and Menkveld and Wang (2009) nd a CAR of 3.5% at Euronext. We
thus conrm the eects on the market found in other studies, liquidity improves, and the
market reacts positively to DMM introductions.
To further investigate these results we look at whether the size of the CAR is related
to properties of the rms hiring DMM's. In panel B of Table 5 we regress the magnitude
of the CAR on the liquidity, measured by the spread, of the stock before the DMM start,
also controlling for the rm size. The regression shows a positive relationship between
the spread and CAR. This means that the larger the spread before the DMM start, the
bigger the reaction. So the positive market reaction is largest for the least liquid stocks.
14There are quite a few cases where the rm hires a DMM at the same time as the rm's IPO. In
several cases the DMM agreement is likely to be part of the IPO \package" where the underwriter also
acts as a market maker to keep a liquidity market for the stock after the IPO.
17Figure 3
Event study, announcement date of DMM
The event study is done using the standard methods, as for example exposited in Campbell, Lo, and
MacKinlay (1997). The gure plots the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR), where CAR is
calculated relative to the market model. Specically, for each stock i and date t we calculate ARt =
rit   (b i + b i(rmt   rft)), where AR is the abnormal return, rmt the market return, and b i and b i the
estimated parameters. We use an equally weighted stock market index for the market. The gure shows
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from 5 days before the DMM announcement (at t=0) to 5 days
after the DMM announcement. We only use stocks for which we can identify the announcement date
















The tables provide further information about the event study. In Panel A we test the signicance of the
CAR's for the event study. The second column lists the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for
the given lag, where CAR is calculated relative to the market model. Specically, for each stock i and
date t we calculate ARt = rit   (b i + b i(rmt   rft)), where AR is the abnormal return, rmt the market
return, and b i and b i the estimated parameters. We use an equally weighted stock market index for the
market. For each stock, CARi is the sum of abnormal returns, and the table lists the average of CARi
for each lag. The next two columns provides the two standard tests for signicance of the average CAR
being dierent from zero, J1 and J2, as exposited in Campbell et al. (1997). These test statistics follow
a t-distribution.
In Panel B we show results of a regression where the CAR at a 10 day horizon is the dependent variable.
In these regressions we look at two explanatory variables: Liquidity, measured by relative spread one
year before the DMM initialization, and rm size, proxied by the log of operating income.
Panel A: Signicance test of CAR's in event study
lag  CAR J1 J2
0 0.0205 7.337 8.310
1 0.0180 5.982 6.669
2 0.0204 6.324 6.631
3 0.0168 4.899 4.527
4 0.0141 3.917 3.650
5 0.0118 3.115 2.791
Panel B: Determinants of CAR.
coe (serr) [pvalue]
Constant -0.1637 (0.1163) [0.16]
liqudity(rel spread) 1.5662 (0.9221) [0.09]
ln(operating income) 0.0086 (0.0088) [0.33]
n 62
 R2 0.06
194 The decision to hire a DMM { Is cash ow rele-
vant?
We now want to look for a link between expected future cash ows and the hiring of
DMM's. We do this indirectly, by asking whether the factors we indicated earlier, capital
needs and repurchases, are relevant for the DMM decision. In the empirical implementa-
tion we also consider the possibility of exit by large shareholders, and control for other
factors which aect the DMM decision, such as stock liquidity.
Specically, we model the decision to hire a DMM as a probit regression.15 In a
probit we dierentiate between two possible outcomes, and model the determinants of
this choice. We choose to look at each calendar year as a primitive, and count as success
if the rm has a DMM at some point during the year. We thus lump both rms having
decided to hire a DMM during the year, and those rms which had a DMM before, and
just decides to keep the DMM agreement going. We view this annual split into calendar
year as natural since most of the corporate decisions we look at here, such as repurchasing
and large capital issues, need approval from the annual meeting, which normally happens
only once a year. The sample is thus all combinations of rm and year in the 2004-2009
period. If a rm have a DMM at some point in a given year that is viewed as success in
the probit.
The explanatory variables of interest are related to the probability of the rm directly
interacting with the capital markets in the near future, either due to capital needs, or
repurchasing stocks. As proxies for capital needs we use several variables. One is the
rm's growth opportunities, measured by Tobin's Q. We assume that capital needs are
increasing in growth opportunities, which implies that the probability of hiring a DMM
is increasing in Q. In addition to Q, which has the problem that it may be open to other
interpretations than growth potential, we also consider recent growth in the sales of the
rm. We assume that a rm that is currently experiencing high growth in sales is more
likely to need more capital for investments further on.
An alternative to growth opportunities is to look at this ex post: Do rms with a
DMM raise new capital in the near future? To test it this way we use a dummy for
whether the rm issues equity in the next three years. Under the hypothesis that rms
want to improve liquidity before they raise capital we expect the probability of hiring a
DMM to be increasing in this dummy variable.
We also look at repurchases. If a rm wants to do a repurchase of the company's
stock in the near future, improved liquidity in the rm's stock will reduce the price
15We have in unreported estimations also considered a logit formulation. The overall conclusions from
those regressions are similar to the ones with a probit formulation.
20impact when the stock's are bought in the market, and hence lower the costs of executing
the repurchases. We use two dierent measures of repurchases, one ex ante and one
ex post. The ex ante measure comes from the regulation of how repurchases must be
performed by Norwegian rms. Before a given rm can repurchase shares, it must have
approval by the annual meeting of shareholders to repurchase up to a given percentage
of the rm's shares. This approval is valid for up to a maximum of fteen months, and
has to be renewed at the annual meeting. The ex ante measure we use is whether, in the
year we analyze, the rm has gotten approval for a repurchase program. As our ex post
measure we use a dummy for whether the rm actually repurchase shares within three
years of the DMM hire.
As mentioned in the theoretical discussion, we also include a potential third explana-
tion for why a rm would want to hire a DMM; exit for the original owners. In motivations
for IPO's one often mentions the desire for the original owners to lower their stakes, for
diversication or consumption purposes. These original owners often have a period before
they can start divesting their stakes. Improved liquidity of the rm's shares would lower
the price impact at the time of such sales. These cases would be registered as insider
trades, which we have access to. We therefore look at the number of insider trades in the
period after the DMM initiation to measure such cases. To proxy for the exit decision
by insiders, we count the number of large inside sales by insiders.16 This is an ex post
measure. As an ex ante measure we believe that this explanation is most likely to be
valid for recently listed rms, and use a dummy for whether the rm listed less than two
years before.
There are however a number of additional factors that are likely to inuence whether
a rm hires a DMM. One is the current liquidity of the stock. If it is already liquid, there
is no need to hire a DMM to improve liquidity.
This feature of the data was illustrated in the histograms in gures 1 and 2, where we
saw that for the rms that were traded every day, or had very low spreads, there were few
DMM's. We therefore want to exclude these rms which already have liquid stocks, and
only consider those for whom DMM is a relevant option. We choose to base the selection
on the number of trading days: If the rm, in the year before the one we are considering,
traded more than 90% of the days, we choose to remove the rm's from the sample.17
In table 6 we show the results from a number of probit regression specications. In
the table, each column contains the results for one specication. Starting on the left, we
16By large we use insider transactions larger than 50 thousand NOK (About 10 thousand USD) in
value.
17We could alternatively have based the exclusion on the relative spread, but we chose the number of
trading days as less endogenous than the spread, which is the criterion the contract is written on. We
have in unreported analysis also looked at a sample selection where we remove stocks with low spreads,
and nd similar results.
21have a specication with most of the possible explanatory variables, and then have less
comprehensive versions moving to the right. In doing the analysis it is useful to group the
explanatory variable into those available ex ante (Q, planned repurchases, and listing age)
and those only available ex post (Issuing equity, actual repurchases, and actual insider
trades). We split the results into separate panels for the ex ante and ex post proxies.
In this probit formulation a positive coecient should be interpreted as increased
probability of hiring a DMM. So, for example, a positive coecient on the Q variable
should be interpreted as rms with higher Q have a higher probability of having a DMM.
We see that the data is supportive of our theoretical arguments, although there is some
variation across model specication. If we rst look at the ex ante specications, Q is
always positive and highly signicant. If we think of Q as a measure of growth opportuni-
ties, this is supportive of our argument that rms that are more likely to need capital are
those that hire a DMM. However, Q is a variable with many interpretations, so this is not
unambiguous support. We therefore should also look at the other proxies for this, sales
growth and (ex post) actual equity issues. Here we see that sales growth is not signicant,
which can be due to the noise in this accounting gure. It is thefore more interesting to
look at ex post capital issuance. While the more comprehensive specications are not
signicant, when we look at just equity issuance and repurchases, equity issuance is a
signicant determinant of the decision to hire a DMM. Again the coecient is positive.
Regarding repurchases, we observe that there is strong evidence that rms that plan to
repurchase hire a DMM. Both the ex ante and the ex post proxies for the likelihood of
repurchasing are signicant in a majority of cases. There is almost no evidence suggesting
that exit for the original owners is signicant, insider trades is never signicant, but there
is one case where the dummy for a young rm is a signicant determinant.
Now, the above specication treats new DMM contracts and continuing an already
existing DMM contract equally. However, these decisions may not be equal. We there-
fore do a second probit formulation where we remove all the rms with existing DMM
contracts, and only contrast rms that hire a DMM this year (success in the probit) with
rms without a DMM. The specication may get more cleanly at the tradeo. The re-
sults of this specication is shown in table 7. Comparing these results with the previous
ones, we nd that also here Q is signicant in all specications. In the ex post case,
issuing equity is now signicant in all specications. So there is even stronger evidence
that capital needs is an important determinant of DMM hires.
To conclude, in our indirect analysis we nd evidence consistent with a cash ow
explanation, that rms evaluate the potential future cashows, specically future costs
of interacting with the capital markets, before deciding to hire (or rehire) a DMM.
22Table 6
Having a Designated Market Maker
The tables report results from probit regressions, where the dependent variable is success if the rm has
had a DMM at some point during a year. The explanatory variables are: Liquidity (average relative
bid/ask spread last year), Q (end of last year), planned repurchases, the time the rm has been listed,
whether the rm actually repurchases shares, whether the rm issues equity and the number of large
inside sales, all over a three year period, and the accounting sales growth the previous year. The table
reports the results for a number of dierent specications. Each set of two columns show the result of a
given specication. For each specication we show the coecient estimates, the p-values, the number of
observations (N) and the Pseudo R2. In the sample we only consider rms that traded less than 90% of
the available days the year before.
Panel A: Ex ante eplanatory variables
Model 1 2 3 4
Liquidity (RelSpread) -17.417 -26.47 . .
(0.00) (0.00) . .
Q last year 0.293 . 0.308 0.311
(0.00) . (0.00) (0.00)
Sales growth . 0.01 . .
. (0.94) . .
Repurchase program 0.257 0.022 0.358 0.332
(0.13) (0.91) (0.02) (0.04)
Listed < 2 years 0.368 0.180 0.183 .
(0.01) (0.32) (0.17) .
Constant -0.411 0.680 -1.255 -1.180
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 437 311 494 494
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.09
Panel B: Ex post explanatory variables
Model 1 2 3
Liquidity (RelSpread) -16.729 . .
(0.00) . .
Issue equity 0.229 0.18 0.238
(0.12) (0.17) (0.04)
Actual repurchase 0.358 0.442 0.398
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Insider trades (sells) -0.015 0.002 .
(0.46) (0.89) .
Constant -0.137 -1.010 -1.069
(0.45) (0.00) (0.00
N 392 482 633
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.02 0.02
23Table 7
Decision to hire a Designated Market Maker
The tables reports the results from probit regressions, where the dependent variable is the decision to
hire a DMM in this year. The explanatory variables are: Liquidity (relative bid/ask spread last year), Q
(end of last year), whether the rm actually repurchases shares this or next year, whether the rm issues
equity within the same period, the number of inside transactions over the same period, and the accounting
sales growth the year of the DMM initiation. The tables reports the results for a number of dierent
specications. For each specication we show the coecient estimates, the p-values(in parenthesis), the
number of observations (n) and the Pseudo R2. In the sample we remove all rms with an already
existing DMM contract. Also, we only consider rms that traded less than 90% of the available days the
year before.
Panel A: Ex ante eplanatory variables
Model 1 2 3 4
Liquidity (RelSpread) -7.402 -15.916 . .
(0.03) (0.00) . .
Q last year 0.30 . 0.29 0.30
(0.00) . (0.00) (0.00)
Sales growth . -0.011 . .
. (0.95) . .
Repurchase program 0.152 -0.079 0.201 0.146
(0.49) (0.75) (0.35) (0.49)
Listed < 2 years 0.40 0.181 0.319 .
(0.03) (0.43) (0.06) .
Constant -1.33 -0.29 -1.77 -1.62
(0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00)
N 368 248 425 425
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08
Panel B: Ex post explanatory variables
Model 1 2 3
Liquidity (RelSpread) -6.731 . .
(0.06) . .
Issue equity 0.412 0.35 0.358
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Actual repurchase 0.419 0.469 0.350
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Insider trades (sells) 0.021 0.030 .
(0.34) (0.12) .
Constant -1.259 -1.526 -1.544
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00
N 329 419 559
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.05 0.03
245 Does hiring a DMM aect the rm's cost of capi-
tal?
Let us now look at the second potential channel through which the hiring of a DMM may
aect rm value, cost of capital. We start by looking at asset pricing theory, how can
changes in liquidity aect expected returns? In asset pricing terms, we need to look at
whether liquidity is a priced risk factor in the expected returns of the rm.
5.1 Changes in liquidity risk
In our setting, if the presence of a DMM reduces the liquidity risk, we would expect the
liquidity risk in the stocks of rms that hire a DMM to decrease after the DMM starts
market making. As mentioned earlier, liquidity externalities from hiring a DMM may
help improve liquidity over and above what is provided by the DMM. To examine this
conjecture we start by considering the following two-factor asset pricing model,
erit = ai + 
m
i ermt + 
liq
i LIQt + et (2)
where erit is the excess return of stock i on day t, ai is a constant term, ermt is the excess
return on the market on day t, and m
i is stock i's loading on the market factor. LIQt is a
liquidity factor similar to the Fama and French size and book/market factors,18 and 
liq
i
is stock i's loading on the liquidity risk factor. In general, a large positive 
liq
i coecient
means that the stock has high liquidity risk, while a low (or negative) coecient means
that the stock has low liquidity risk. If the presence of a DMM reduces the liquidity risk
this would manifest in changes of the estimates of liq. This is what we investigate.
Panel A in Table 8 shows the average and median liquidity beta (liq) estimated using
data one year before the rm hires a DMM (\Pre DMM"), and one year after the rm
has hired a DMM (\post DMM"). Both the mean and median liquidity beta before the
DMM contract is positive and is reduced after the DMM hiring. This drop in liquidity
beta is highly signicant both with respect to the mean as well as the median. Thus, in
support of our conjecture, the stocks of rms that hire a DMM experience a signicant
reduction in liquidity risk.
To further investigate how the liquidity risk changes, in panel B of Table 8 we construct
8 portfolios of stocks based on their pre-DMM liquidity beta, with P1 being the portfolio
with the lowest pre-DMM liquidity beta and P8 containing stocks with the highest pre-
18The construction of the liquidity factor is detailed in Ns et al. (2009), essentially the LIQt factor
portfolio is calculated as a return dierence between a portfolio of the least liquid stocks at the OSE and
a portfolio with the most liquid stocks at the OSE.
25DMM liquidity beta. The liquidity betas of these portfolios vary in magnitude between
 0:42 to +0:94. After the DMM hire we observe liquidity betas much more similar, both
with respect to sign and size, across all groups. Interestingly, we also nd that stocks that
had the lowest pre-DMM liquidity beta (stocks in P1), experience a signicant increase
in liquidity risk. We do not have any good explanation for why we observe this, however,
one reason may be that we are we underestimate the pre-DMM liquidity beta for these
stocks. With respect to the portfolios with higher pre-DMM liquidity risk, we see that
the stocks in portfolios 4 to 8 experience a signicant decline in liquidity risk.
Figure 4
Pre- versus post-DMM liquidity beta
The gure shows the average and median liquidity beta before and after the rm having a DMM. We
group stocks into eight portfolios based on their pre-DMM liquidity beta. The average pre-DMM beta
grey bars and the pre-DMM median liquidity beta are the white bars. The lines show the mean (solid)






























To show that the results are robust also for the median rm, Figure 4 plots the pre-
DMM (grey and white bars) average and median liquidity beta across stock groups and
the post-DMM liquidity betas (solid and dotted lines). Overall, there seems to be strong
support for the conjecture that hiring a designated market maker with a contractual
obligation to keep the spread at or below a maximum level reduces the liquidity risk
loading for these stocks.
26Table 8
DMM impact on liquidity risk
Panel A of the table shows the average and median liquidity beta (liq) across DMM stocks before (pre)
and after (post) the DMM agreement. The liquidity beta is estimated using 1 year of daily data before
and after the DMM contract is established as,
erit = ai + m
i ermt + 
liq
i LIQt + et
The dierence in liquidity beta is the dierence between the post- and pre estimates. The last two
columns show the change in beta with the associated p-value from a t-test for the dierence being
signicant. In the second row of Panel A, we report the medians of the distribution of liquidity betas
estimated for the pre-DMM and post-DMM periods. We perform a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for
the equality of medians between the pre-DMM and post-DMM distributions. Also,  and  indicate a
signicant dierence between the post- and pre-DMM liquidity beta at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
The last column provides the p-values from a test of whether the change in the average (median) liquidity
beta is signicantly dierent from zero.
Panel B of the table shows the average liquidity beta for subgroups of rms grouped on their pre-DMM
liquidity beta.
Liquidity beta (liq) Test for dierence
n Pre DMM Post DMM Post-Pre p-value
Panel A: All stocks
All stocks, mean 89 0.114 -0.062 -0.176 0.002
All stocks, median 89 0.044 -0.022 -0.157 0.014
Panel B: Groups of stocks based on pre-DMM liq
P1 (Low liq) 11 -0.420 -0.049 0.371 0.012
P2 11 -0.235 -0.055 0.181 0.111
P3 11 -0.105 -0.039 0.066 0.328
P4 11 0.004 -0.169 -0.174 0.053
P5 11 0.065 -0.146 -0.211 0.001
P6 11 0.211 -0.020 -0.231 0.038
P7 11 0.378 0.000 -0.378 0.000
P8 (High liq) 12 0.940 -0.019 -0.959 0.001
275.2 Liquidity risk premium
Looking at the risk loadings does not let us evaluate the economic signicance associated
with the reduction in liquidity risk for DMM stocks. To measure this signicance we look
at the pricing implications of the reduction in liquidity risk.
To do so, we rst need estimates of the general risk premium associated with liquidity
in the Norwegian stock market. The estimate of a liquidity risk premium will make it
possible to gauge the economic signicance of the reduction in liquidity risk and indirectly
say something about the potential eect on the cost of raising capital. In addition, it is
useful to see where in the distribution the liquidity beta for the DMM stocks fall relative
to the full cross-section of stocks.
A comprehensive crossectional analysis of asset pricing at the OSE was done in Ns
et al. (2009). Among their analyzes was an estimation of this two factor model, with
market and liquidity factors. Their analysis was performed using data for 1980-2008. We
extend their analysis to also include 2009. The analysis reported in Table 9 corresponds
to table 11 on page 30 in Ns et al. (2009), and we refer to that paper for details about
the methods and data employed.
First, in panel A we report estimates of the factor model (2) for liquidity-sorted
portfolios for the whole exchange, not just the DMM rms we used in Table 8. Since the
nal purpose of this estimation is to obtain an estimate of the unconditional liquidity
risk premium, we use a long sample period covering the period from 1980 through 2009.
Comparing the liquidity beta estimates at the right of the table, we see that for these
portfolios the liquidity premium range from  0:40 to +0:68, a range that is actually
similar to what we saw for the DMM rms in panel B of Table 8, although the DMM
estimates are presumably more noisy as they are just using one year of daily data.
Comparing the liquidity risk loadings for all stocks in Panel A of Table 9 with the
loadings on the liquidity factor before and after the DMM hiring in Table 8, we see that
the average pre-DMM liquidity beta (0.114) is similar to the loading for stocks in the
upper range (portfolio 7 and 8) of liquidity portfolios in Table 9. However, after the rm
has hired the DMM, the liquidity beta is closer to what we nd for the more liquid stocks
on the exchange (portfolio 4 and 5). This suggest that hiring a DMM reduces the market
liquidity risk of these rms.
To gauge the economic signicance of the liquidity risk, we need estimates of the risk
premia associated with the various factors. To estimate this we add the crossectional
pricing restriction given by equation (3):





28The estimate of liq is found by estimating a system where one imposes both equations (2)
and (3) jointly. In panel B of Table 9 we present the risk premia estimates both for the
CAPM as well as the two factor model where we add the liquidity risk factor.19 First
o, in the CAPM estimation we estimate an unconditional market risk premium of 0.014
(1.4%) per month, which annualized is about 18%.20 In the two last columns in panel B
of the table, we present the risk premia estimates associated with the factors in the two
factor model. When adding the liquidity factor to the model we see that the market risk
premium drops slightly. More importantly, we see that the risk premium associated with
the liquidity factor is highly signicant and is of the similar magnitude to the premium
on the market factor. Furthermore, we see that the J-test rejects the null that the CAPM
is able to accurately price the liquidity portfolios, while we are unable to reject the null
for the two-factor model.
To get a measure of the economic magnitude of the liquidity eect, we can use the
estimated risk premium ^ liq = 0:0119 to calculate the annual reduction in expected
returns due to the hiring of a DMM. Combining the premium with the reduction of 0:176
in the loading on liquidity risk found in Table 8, we would calculate the change in required
return as (1 + (0:0119  0:176))12   1 = 0:0254. In other words, the required returns for
rms that hire a DMM is reduced by about 2.5% in annualized terms. This suggest that
the hiring of a DMM has a signicant impact on the rms cost of raising equity capital
and is potentially large enough to justify the fee that the rm pays to the DMM.
6 The economics of the results
Let us now take stock of our results, and again look at them in terms of our original
question. How can a rm justify paying a cash fee just to improve liquidity?
First, we have identied what looks like a link between future capital markets op-
erations and the hiring of a DMM, but we did it in an indirect manner. One way to
evaluate the reasonableness of this conclusion is to ask whether it makes sense in terms
of the economic magnitudes involved. Simply asked, are the potential cost savings large
enough? Let us look at one of these capital market events, issuing equity. How large are
the potential cost savings? While these are not observable, we can do some back-of the
envelope calculations of expected annual costs for a typical company at the Oslo Stock
Exchange. First, given that a rm issues equity, what is the cost? We have some evi-
dence on these costs in the Norwegian market, in Kvaal and degaard (2011). If we for
19The risk premia are estimated by GMM, see Ns et al. (2009) for details.
20While this is a very high equity premium compared to e.g. the US, the average realized returns on
equity in Norway has been very high over the period 1980-2009.
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Liquidity risk at the Oslo Stock Exchange (1980-2009)
The table shows results from a two factor model estimated for ten portfolios sorted by liquidity (relative
spread). The estimation uses monthly data for the period 1980-2009.
Panel A shows the factor loading estimates from a Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) analysis where we
estimate the two-factor model
erit = ai + m
i ermt + 
liq
i LIQt + et
Panel B shows the factor loading estimates from a GMM analysis where we estimate the two-factor
jointly with a cross-section pricing restriction, specied by:
E[erit] = ai + m
i ermt + 
liq
i LIQt




Here erit is the excess return of portfolio i, ai is a constant term, ermt is the excess return on the market,
m
i is portfolio i's loading on the market factor, LIQt is the liquidity factor, and 
liq
i is portfolio i's
loading on the liquidity risk factor.The risk premia are m and liq. numbers in parenthesis are p-values
associated with the coecients.
Panel B shows the (monthly) factor risk premia estimated by GMM with the associated t-values. We
both estimate and test whether the regular CAPM is able to accurately price the 10 liquidity portfolios,
and similarly for the two factor model. The two last rows report the 2 and the associated p-value from
a J-test for over-identifying restrictions for the CAPM and the two factor model, respectively.





1 (low spread) -0.003 (0.36) 1.06 (0.00) -0.40 (0.00)
2 -0.003 (0.41) 0.98 (0.00) -0.37 (0.00)
3 -0.002 (0.64) 1.08 (0.00) -0.24 (0.00)
4 -0.001 (0.70) 0.90 (0.00) -0.19 (0.00)
5 -0.001 (0.87) 0.95 (0.00) -0.09 (0.26)
6 -0.001 (0.79) 0.88 (0.00) -0.13 (0.01)
7 0.000 (0.93) 0.89 (0.00) 0.04 (0.58)
8 0.003 (0.57) 0.93 (0.00) 0.32 (0.00)
9 0.004 (0.40) 1.00 (0.00) 0.44 (0.00)
10 (high spread) 0.006 (0.18) 1.06 (0.00) 0.68 (0.00)
Panel B: Risk premia estimates
CAPM Two factor model
Factor [k] p-val. [k] p-val.
erm 0.014 (0.00) 0.0113 (0.00)
liq - - 0.0119 (0.00)
GMM J-test J(2(8)) p-val. J(2(7)) p-val.
24.47 (0.00) 9.26 (0.16)
30example look at targeted equity issues21 in the 2000-2010 period, the typical equity issue
is a 10% increase in the rm's equity capital. From the rm's point of view, the most
important component of the costs of issuing equity is underpricing, new equity is issued
at a lower price than the current stock price. For the period in question, the median
underpricing was 7.2%. We do not know by how much this underpricing is lowered by
having a DMM, but we can use the dierence in underpricing between small and large
companies to give an indication. For the same period, the median underpricing for the
smallest half of companies at the OSE was 9.1%, while the number for the largest half of
OSE companies was 5.3%. If we use the dierence between these two as an estimate, a
rm can lower the underpricing by 3.8 percentage points by hiring a DMM. What is this
number in NOK terms? From table 2 we see that the median rm with DMM's have a
value of 850 million NOK. The potential cost saving is in other words of the magnitude
of NOK 850 mill  10%  3:8% = 3:23 mill.22
Now, this is the cost once the decision to issue has been made, but any given rm
will only have expectations about whether it needs capital, and the expected cost in any
given year is the probability of capital issue times the 3.2 million we just estimated. We
can estimate this probability too from the record of equity issuance at the OSE. In the
ten year period we are looking at there were a total of 933 targeted equity issues at the
OSE, or 93 issues a year. If we use the frequency of equity issuance as an estimate of
the probability, we need to divide this number by the number of rms at the exchange
each year. The typical crossection at the OSE has about 250 listed shares, giving an
estimated probability of a targeted equity issue of 93:3
250 = 37%. With this probability we
would estimate the expected annual cost of a new issue as NOK 2:3 mill  37% = 1:2
million NOK. When we compare this number with annual costs of keeping a DMM in
the three hundred thousand region, the potential costs savings from having a DMM are
clearly large enough to be of rst order importance in the decision to hire a DMM.
Let us next look at the implications of our estimates of how improved liquidity changes
the cost of capital. In fact, these seem to be too good to be true. Let us go back to the




r   liquidity premium decrease
:
If for example the current cost of the capital r is 10%, a 2.5% lowering of the liquidity
premium would indicate an increase in rm value by a third. Even though the typical
21We do not include the rights issues, as the underpricing is not as clearly a cost, in a rights issue the
underpricing is part of the compensation to the current shareholders.
22This is about half a million USD, the exhange rates in december 2010 were NOK/USD=6.15 and
NOK/EUR=8.06.
31cost of capital for these rms is higher than 10%, it still seems like a large valuation eect
from a simple increase in the liquidity of the rm's equity. It also seem to run counter
to the typical Miller Modigliani intuition that one needs to aect the rm's operations.
Now, one way that a lowering of cost of capital is actually going to aect the rm's
operations is that a lower cost of capital will make more positive NPV projects feasible,
so it will change the rm's operations that way.
If we take this result as given, a signicant lowering in the liquidity premium, it would
indicate that there are signicant public benets from improving liquidity, much above
the costs paid by the rm. In fact, given the public goods nature of liquidity, our results
indicate that it may be desirable to subsidize liquidity provision in equity markets.
7 Conclusion
We have investigated what motivates rms to spend cash hiring \Designated Market
Makers" for the trading of the rm's stock. We argue that from a corporate nance view,
this should primary be inuenced by whether the rm expects to interact with the capital
markets in the near future. Using data from the Oslo Stock Exchange we conrm this
hypothesis, we show that measures relevant for the likelihood of the rm to go to the
capital markets in the near future are signicant determinants of rm's decisions to hire
DMM's.
Liquidity in the trading of the rms stock is thus mainly valuable to the rm because
of the stock markets primary role for the stock issuers, raising of new capital. Phrasing
the result this way also show why the result of this paper has wider implications. If we
go back to the literature on the interaction of corporate nance and the liquidity of a
company's stock, the liquidity is shown to interact with the cost of capital of the rm.
But this literature still have not faced the disconnect between the liquidity of trading in
the secondary market (the stock market) { to the rm, all that happens is the replacing
of one owner by another { and internal investment decisions in the rm, where the cost
of capital is inuenced by the liquidity of the stock. Our results points to the economic
channel giving such results. What matters is the potential for raising capital through
equity markets. Liquidity matters because it aects the terms at which new capital is
raised.
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